RESTRUCTURING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FOR POST CONFLICT AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Unfolding world events including war and extensive natural disasters in the past three years demonstrate that the military element of national power is more responsive and capable than any other even though it is organized specifically for war. However, we ask our combat units to transition almost immediately to post conflict reconstruction and nation building or deploy directly into a security and disaster relief environment. This is a difficult task at best. A potential solution is to organize a portion of our National Guard forces to conduct post major combat operations focused on Reconstruction and Nation Building, which share numerous tasks with domestic and global disaster response. This force would train specifically on Security and Stability Operations, Physical Infrastructure Operations, and Political Infrastructure Operations, and work in an environment that includes interagency, NGO and Coalition support. This paper will explore new National Guard structure and how it will better fit into overall missions that we ask the military element of national power to support. To understand the current National Guard organizational philosophy we must first understand its organizational history.
National Guard Organizational History
The National Guard is the oldest of all the uniformed services. Originally formed to help fight Indians in the newly expanding colonies, these first militiamen saw combat in the same year they were formed. With a successful campaign completed against the Pequot Tribe the soldiers returned home to their farms. However, the Massachusetts General Court saw the need to keep a portion of their militia in a "near constant state of heightened readiness." 2 This led to the Minuteman concept where the Massachusetts legislators passed a law requiring that one third of the militia "shall be ready at half an hour's warning" to respond to alarms. 3 Soon all but one of the other colonies raised formal militias and passed similar legislation. Because they were geographically oriented to their colony or county their mission remained as a local defense force and was therefore limited to short-term emergency operations 4 . Many colonies believed that they could not and should not send their militias beyond their colonial borders except under extreme circumstances. However, during the American Revolution, the militias rallied to support the cause of freedom across the colonies. the National Guard a formal part of the U.S. Army reserve forces and therefore the readiness, training, and equipping of the National Guard for their federal mission became the responsibility of the Federal Government. 6 These acts created the Division of Military Affairs (DMA) the predecessor of today's National Guard Bureau (NGB) with responsibility of overseeing the readiness of all of the state militias for federal service when required. 7 The National Defense Act of 1916 completed the legislative transformation of the state militias to the National Guard. It gave the Federal Government the ability to mobilize the National Guard as part of the total force and deploy them overseas in times of international crisis or war. It also required the National Guard to organize into units that were like the active component. It standardized the training requirements for officer's commissions bringing it up to the standards of active duty officers. The National Guard took to the field 18 infantry divisions, 300,000 men. Those State troops doubled the strength of the Army at once, and their presence in the field gave the country a sense that it had passed the lowest ebb of its weakness. Nine of those divisions crossed the Atlantic to Europe and Africa and nine went to the far reaches of the Pacific. The soldiers of the guard fought in every action in which the Army participated from Bataan to Okinawa. They made a brilliant record on every fighting front. They proved once more the value of the trained citizen-soldier. 12 With the total mobilization of the National Guard for WWII, the states found themselves 
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Immediately following WWII and the emergence of the nuclear age, and with it the Cold War, the U.S. Military underwent yet another reorganization. During this period, the National Guard grew to 325,000 soldiers in 27 divisions and 20 regimental combat teams. 14 The greatest challenge for this expanding Guard force was the lack of adequate facilities for the soldiers to meet and train. In 1950, Congressional legislation called for substantial funding to assist the states in new armory construction. Throughout the 1950s, modern armories sprang up across the country with improved capability for National Guard soldiers to meet and train. 15 In addition, these armories provided a resource for local communities to hold meetings and other events.
This re-established the National Guard as a community based organization, which is critical to its success even today. 16 This critical influx of resources for the National Guard was all part of the Army reorganization focused on the Cold War and the potential for a major kinetic conflict in Europe fighting the communists. However, during this reorganization the Army would need the services of the National Guard to fight communism in a far different theater. NGB notified the first National Guard units of their impending mobilization for deployment to Korea in the summer of 1950. Less than one-year later over 100,000 guardsmen were on active duty supporting the war in the Far East. 17 Two National Guard Divisions, the 45 th and 40 th , deployed to Korea and remained there for the duration of the conflict. 18 The Army mobilized six more National Guard divisions, two deployed to Europe and four remained in the United States as part of the Strategic Reserve. By the end of the war, the Army mobilized 138,600 National Guard soldiers. 19 This mobilization was the beginning of a force structure policy for the National Guard of the Governors ensued, the courts upheld the amendment and the role and scope of the National Guard continued to expand. 21 These total force initiatives were part of the Reagan build up to increase readiness and global visibility of our forces that demonstrated our total capability.
It forced an economically struggling Soviet Union to pour more money into their military. In concert with brilliant application of the diplomatic and economic elements of national power, the policy led to the collapse of the Warsaw pact and the end of the Cold War.
Although reductions in the armed forces following the end of the Cold War were beginning to take place, the National Guard remained at the highest state of readiness in its history. The total force policies of the 1980s had left a highly trained and deployable National Guard These were a mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units that organized and deployed with equipment specifically tailored for the mission.
The Capability Gap
This list of recent examples is to demonstrate that although our military forces have a substantial capability to adapt to a changing environment, they are not organized, trained, or equipped for the mission sets we ask them to do most often. Coalition forces completed major combat operations during OIF in a matter of weeks and the combat units were required to transition on the fly, whereas the ongoing security and nation building activities are taking years. The most straightforward reason why the Army struggled in OIF Phase 4 to achieve the effectiveness demonstrated in the preceding combat phase was that it was, by design, relatively ill prepared for it. In spite of COIN (Counterinsurgency) and S&R (Stabilization and Reconstruction) operations having occupied the majority of the Army's operational time since the Cold War, and their being and inevitable consequence of the GWOT [Global War on Terror], these roles have not been core Army Activities. The Army's focus has been conventional warfighting and its branches into COIN and S&R have been regarded as a diversion, to be undertaken reluctantly, and preferably by Special Operations Forces and other specialist, many of whom are in the Army Reserves.
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A predominant and sometimes controversial author of books on global security and U.S military policy, Thomas Barnett, has some very similar concepts on the role of the military after conventional operations are completed. In his latest book, Blueprint for Action , he describes a "System Administrators" approach to the Phase 4 operations. He says conducting continued military kinetic operations such as security and counterinsurgency operations are critical but we must expand our capability into a force which ". . . likewise provides civil security with its police component, as well as civilian personnel with expertise in rebuilding networks, infrastructure, and social and political institutions." 29 He goes on to say that continuing to build capabilities in our military establishment to simply kill insurgents will result in a requirement to stay and keep killing them. He says, "Killing an insurgency starts with the military defeat of the rebel forces, but it never ends there. You either dry up the sources of insurgency recruiting by offering the target population a better life and better deal or you better plan on just killing rebels for the long haul.
Better warfighting is not the answer; better peacemaking and nation building is." 30 
Building a Capability
Reviewing the organizational history of the National Guard reveals some interesting observations. First, with the exception of full mobilizations for WWI and WWII, the National Guard has not deployed more than two divisions into combat. Second, the National Guard, as the Army's primary reserve combat force reorganizes based on requirements of the active army. complete. 31 The organization would provide a flexible force designed with capabilities to go into unstable environments whether in a foreign country or domestically to coordinate and synchronize all aspects of stability and support operations. 32 The first step in designing this force structure is to identify the tasks required for these operations. Looking at these tasks in major categories can allow us to organize our forces functionally to better accomplish these tasks ( Table 1 ). The major functions in all of these operations are to • Provide security and rebuild organic security capability
• Help establish civil infrastructure
• Help rebuild physical infrastructure
Under current transformation plans, the National Guard will retain its eight divisions. The transformation will reduce the number of combat brigades while increasing combat support and 
FIGURE 1, NATION BUILDING DIVISIONS
The theater contingency campaign plan would include these forces tailored to the scope and scale of the campaign. The number of divisions could range from less than one up to four.
The only structure not currently available for this concept is the one that makes the most sense to reside in the National Guard. They are the Civil Affairs Brigades. A limited number of these units currently reside in the USAR. As a community based organization, the National Guard possesses a significant number of personnel with tremendous civil experience. In addition, it makes more sense for civil affairs units to reside in the Guard for use during domestic crisis as an asset to the state Governors.
Organization and Training
The eight National Guard divisions could easily transform into their modular configuration as planned and still perform the requirements of a Nation Building division headquarters with minimal changes. The main difference has more to do with the training that these units conduct. believes strongly that the more National Guard units, "look like, smell like, and train like" the active duty units, the more credibility they will have. 38 Making the National Guard divisions different from their active counterparts may lead to increased resource battles between the components and eventual mistrust. However, if appropriately packaged as a concept that allows the two components to focus their organizational and training efforts where they are best suited, then the potential benefits far outweigh the risk.
An additional risk is the perception that the National Guard is no longer good enough to fill major combat roles and must be relegated to peacekeeping. In this nation-building concept, the 
Conclusion
The role of the National Guard in the National Military Strategy is at a crossroads. The traditional practice of the using the National Guard as a strategic reserve force organized in large combat formations to help fight major regional conflicts is outdated and impractical.
Emerging global trends demonstrate that the world needs the U.S. Military to do more than win decisively in combat. It must have the ability to transition from major combat operations to stabilization and reconstruction operations in rapid succession. The most capable force for this mission lies in the National Guard. The dual role of the Guard in support of domestic operations fits well with the tasks for stabilization and reconstruction. By filling this role, the National Guard
